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ABSTRACT9
In this paper, exact analytic expressions are given to evaluate the reliability of systems consisting10
of components, connected in parallel or series, subject to imprecise failure distributions. We also11
proposed a simplified version of the first order reliability method to deal with imprecision. This12
development allows engineers to evaluate the reliability of systems without having to resort to13
optimisation techniques and/or Monte Carlo simulation, which are costly both in terms of the time14
spent programming and the time required for computation. Avoiding double loop Monte Carlo15
simulation removes a significant barrier to the modelling of epistemic uncertainties in industrial16
probabilistic safety analysis workflows. In this way, we hope to unite the conventional literature17
which is applied to probabilistic safety assessment in industrywith recent developments in imprecise18
probability to deal with severe uncertainty.19
This framework is attractive because we do not need to assume a distribution for our epistemic20
uncertainty, which permits a robust analysis even with limited data. We validate the derived21
analytical expressions against the results from simulation for the reliability analysis of the concrete22
containment of a nuclear power plant.23
INTRODUCTION24
Probabilistic safety analysis (PSA) was first introduced in the 1970s as a means of establishing25
the probability of a certain amount of radiation release to the environment from a nuclear structure.26
It is perceived to address many of the weaknesses of deterministic analysis (Modarres and Kim27
2010). For example, deterministic analysis relies heavily on engineering conservatism which could28
be difficult to quantify in practice. In addition, it is not always clear what the most conservative29
value for a particular parameter is when performing a black box analysis.30
In recent years, techniques from the area of imprecise probability have been increasingly31
applied to Probabilistic Safety Analysis studies in academic literature (Karanki et al. 2009) (Beer32
and Patelli 2015). Imprecise probabilities offer a natural framework to model uncertainty due33
to lack of knowledge (epistemic uncertainty). Epistemic uncertainty is particularly important34
in the nuclear industry where there is often a lack of sufficient data to completely model relevant35
phenomena. This uncertainty can bemodelled as interval uncertainty in the parameters of traditional36
probability distributions, which is known as probability bounds analysis, where the imprecise37
distributions themselves are referred to as probability boxes (Ferson et al. 2003). This approach38
strikes a pragmatic compromise between engineering conservatism and overly optimistic analyses.39
However, the techniques proposed usually require sophisticated simulation techniques (Patelli 2016;40
Patelli et al. 2017a). For example, to propagate uncertainty through a complex black box model41
computationally expensive Monte Carlo or optimisation methods are used (Patelli et al. 2015).42
Although efficient simulation approaches for dealing with imprecision have recently been proposed43
(e.g. using Line Sampling (de Angelis et al. 2015), Subset simulation (Patelli et al. 2011) and tools44
to deal with probability boxes (Patelli et al. 2014; Patelli et al. 2017b; Faes et al. 2019)), their use45
in the nuclear industry is not yet widespread. In Ref. (Le Duy et al. 2010) recommendations are46
made for how available data can be used to define probability boxes. In Ref. (Qiu et al. 2008)47
approximate results were derived for structural systems where the First Order Reliability Method48
(FORM) could be applied. In the United States the nuclear regulator (Budnitz et al. 1985) refers49
to the work of Kennedy who provides many analytic relationships to establish the fragility curve50
for a containment with a conventional probabilistic treatment (Kennedy et al. 1980). The effect of51
epistemic uncertainty in PSA with conventional probability was considered in (Prinja et al. 2017;52
Sun and Yao 2008).53
In (conventional) structural probabilistic safety analysis often the relations used are simple54
analytic expressions which, in contrast to the methods based on imprecise probability, allow the55
failure probability of the system to be computed with no Monte Carlo simulation at all. This offers56
two significant advantages. Firstly, the computational time required to complete the calculations57
is greatly reduced, which allows projects to be completed on shorter timescales and less money to58
be spent on High Performance Computing. Secondly, the time of engineers is saved as they are59
not required to spend large amounts of time programming Monte Carlo simulations, which reduces60
expenditure for their employer, and consequently benefits the industry as a whole.61
In this paper, we will propose imprecise probabilistic analogues to many of the probabilistic62
formulae proposed in Kennedy’s paper which have become standard expressions used in proba-63
bilistic safety analysis. In this way, we hope to unite the conventional literature which is applied64
to PSA in industry with relatively recent developments in imprecise probability. The analysis will65
make extensive use of the probability boxes introduced in probability bounds theory. We will66
demonstrate how to establish the fragility curve of a system when components are connected in67
parallel or series, and when the failures of the components may have unknown dependencies. We68
will demonstrate how to establish a probability box fragility curve when the product of random69
variables must be considered. Then, we will also demonstrate how this can be used to calculate70
the failure probability when there is additional imprecision in the load distribution. We will also71
consider the implications of the imprecise First Order Reliability Method (FORM), and show how72
we can analytically obtain results from a simplified calculation when the exact reliability index73
is difficult to obtain. All of the above are particularly useful when combined with an event tree74
to e.g. yield the expected radiation release to the environment or to calculate the reliability of75
complex plant. The proposed approach considers only independence of components or complete76
lack of information on dependence. In fact, the framework of imprecise probability enables the77
consideration of correlations between events, for example via convex sets or copula functions. This78
would be a useful future generalisation of the work in this paper, as any additional information79
available will allow the bounds on the probability of failure to be tightened.80
The merit of this approach is that the entire fragility curve can be constructed by one analyst81
using conventional spreadsheet packages, without the requirement to use complicated simulation82
techniques which would require large amounts of time spent programming by the analyst. Therefore83
the benefits of traditional PSA approaches are retained whilst also obtaining the advantages of using84
probability bounds theory.85
In Section 2 an brief overview is presented of a typical PSA calculation used to determine the86
fragility curve of a system. In Section 3 we propose analogues to the expressions from Section87
2 using probability bounds analysis. In Section 4 a simple example is presented. In Section 488
we show how similar methods can be applied to obtain partial information about a more complex89
system. In Section 5 a brief summary is given.90
PROBABILISTIC SAFETY ANALYSIS91
Probabilistic safety analysis is broken down into three levels. Level 1 PSA studies the reactor92
and determines accident sequences which are likely to result in a release from the reactor pressure93
vessel. Level 2 considers the containment structure, and how likely this is to fail in an accident. This94
is done by creating a fragility curve for the containment, which quantifies the failure probability at95
a particular load. Level 3 PSA combines the information produced by level 1 and level 2 PSA to96
provide the probability of radiation release to the environment (Commission et al. 2005).97
In PSA level 2 the main goal is to establish the fragility curve of a (nuclear) structure (Pellissetti98
et al. 2017). In seismic hazard analysis the fragility curve expresses the failure probability of the99
structure as a function of the peak ground acceleration. This can then be used to conduct safety100
analysis once the conditions inside the reactor (the ‘source term’) and the external conditions are101
known (Sundararajan 2012).102
The fragility of a system is its probability of failure conditioned on a particular load. Therefore,103
in the context of this section of the paper, bounds on failure probabilities may be taken as bounds104
on fragilities. For a system, S, of components, ci, connected in series (i.e. the system will fail if one105
component fails) the fragility of the system, f (s |a), at a damage measure a (i.e. the peak ground106
acceleration) is given by107
f (s |a) = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
[1 − f (ci |a)], (1)108
when the fragilities of the individual components are independently distributed (Kennedy et al.109
1980).110
If the dependence is not known then the value of f (s |a) given by Eqn. (1) is an upper bound111
which, for the small probabilities relevant to this type of analysis, approaches the value given by112
the more general Boole’s inequality, in what is known as the rare event approximation (Collet113
1996). Boole’s inequality can be used to calculate an upper bound on the probability that at least114
one event from a set of events occurs, i.e. the probability that a series system fails, when the115
dependence between different events is unknown. The Fréchet inequalities are similar upper and116
lower bounds that apply to the union and intersection of events when no information is available117
about the dependence of events (Rüschendorf 1991).118
Boole’s inequality is equal to the right hand side of the Fréchet inequality for the upper bound119
of the union of n events:120
max(P(A1), ..., P(An)) ≤ P
(
n⋃
i=1
Ai
)
≤ min(1, P(A1) + ... + P(An)). (2)121
The other Fréchet inequality (which applies for components connected in parallel) being122
max(0, P(A1) + ... + P(An) − (n − 1)) ≤ P
(
n⋂
i=1
Ai
)
≤ min(P(A1), ..., P(An)). (3)123
Note that both Boole’s inequality and the Fréchet inequalities are conservative bounds which should124
be used when the dependence between failure events is unknown.125
If the fragilities of the components are independently distributed and the components are126
connected in parallel (i.e. the system has redundancy and fails if every component fails) then the127
system’s fragility is given by128
f (s |a) =
∏
ci⊂S
[ f (ci |a)], . (4)129
If the dependence between component fragilities is not known then the value of f (s |a) given130
by Eqn. (4) is an upper bound (Kennedy et al. 1980). These formulae can also be applied to131
connected systems which form super systems, in which case the unknown dependence versions on132
the equations should be used (Kennedy et al. 1980).133
In probabilistic safety analysis f (ci |a) is usually modelled as a log normally distributed random134
variable, because the physical quantities being modelled must be greater than zero, i.e.135
f (ci |a) = φ
©­­­­«
log
(
a
βi
)
σi
ª®®®®¬
, (5)136
where βi represents the median failure value and σi is the logarithmic standard deviation of137
component ci, and φ is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a standard normal variable.138
Typically in probabilistic safety analysis aleatory uncertainty can be distinguished from epistemic139
uncertainty by modelling the β for any particular component as a lognormally distributed random140
variable with parameters βe and σe. Hence the outer distribution (i.e. Eqn. (5), with logarithmic141
standard deviation σa) will describe aleatory uncertainty, and epistemic uncertainty is modelled by142
the nested distribution (i.e. the inner distribution, the CDF over β, with parameters βe and σe).143
In order to allow this model to be used for computation, typically the mean distribution is ob-144
tained (more widely known as the ‘composite’ distribution), which is also log-normally distributed.145
This is an averaged distribution obtained by combining the aleatory uncertainty (i.e. σa from the146
outer distribution) and the epistemic uncertainty (our uncertainty in the distribution parameters,147
σe) (Kim et al. 2010). For the composite distribution, the logarithmic standard deviation, σc, is the148
euclidean norm of the two lognormal logarithmic standard deviations, i.e. σc =
√
σ2a + σ
2
e and the149
median is simply the median of the inner (epistemic) distribution, βc = βe (a detailed derivation150
is provided in Ref. (Kaplan et al. 1994)). This distribution is assumed to be conservative, since it151
approaches the asymptotic values in the tails of the distributions described by the extrema of the152
epistemic distribution (Kennedy et al. 1980). However, in many cases there may be insufficient153
data to truly know that our epistemic uncertainty is log-normally distributed.154
Figure 1 shows an example of a composite distribution compared to the median fragility curve155
and the 5th and 95th percentiles of the epistemic uncertainty. As discussed, the mean curve156
approaches the extreme outer distributions’ tails (obtained by taking β from the 5th and 95th157
percentiles of the nested epistemic distribution and σ = σa). Clearly the median curve could not be158
used for this purpose as it does not adequately describe the range of our belief in the peak ground159
acceleration.160
PROBABILITY BOUNDS ANALYSIS161
Fragility Curve162
Let us consider the fragility distribution for a general component given by Eqn. (1). Instead of163
considering βi as a random variable and finding the composite distribution we will instead consider164
uncertainty in βi and σi as intervals. This enables the random variables to be converted into165
probability boxes, since probability boxes are nothing more than cumulative distribution functions166
with interval imprecision on the distribution parameters. This framework is attractive for several167
reasons. Firstly, we do not need to assume a distribution for our epistemic uncertainty, which168
permits a robust analysis even with limited data. Secondly, instead of having to find the composite169
distribution we can simply find the envelope of our distributions. Note that uniform distributions170
are conceptually different from interval incertitude, since a uniform distribution specifies that each171
value in the support of the distribution is equally likely, whereas an interval describes lack of172
knowledge in a set-like manner, without implications for the likelihood of different elements within173
the set. Furthermore, note that using probability distributions to represent epistemic uncertainty174
has been shown to have undesirable consequences (Balch 2016) (Balch et al. 2017).175
In Appendix I we show that if βi ∈ [βi, βi] and σi ∈ [σi, σi] then the distributional probability176
box can be converted to a distribution free probability box where the upper bound of the fragility177
is given by178
f (ci |a) = φ
©­­­­­­«
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log
(
a
βi
)
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log
(
a
βi
)
2σi
ª®®®®®®¬
, (6)179
180
and the lower bound of the fragility is given by181
f (ci |a) = φ
©­­­­­­«
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log ( aβi
)
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log ( aβi
)
2σi
ª®®®®®®¬
, (7)182
183
where the | · | operator represents the absolute value of a quantity. These bounds are shown in184
Figure 2. In general converting distributional probability boxes to distribution free probability boxes185
results in loss of information (Alvarez et al. 2017). However, in this case Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7)186
are a result of taking the natural extension of Eqn. (5) and therefore the values obtained will be the187
tightest bounds possible, so in the specific case of Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7) there is no consequence188
to making the conversion. The other results in this section provide the tightest possible bound in189
the case of unknown dependence, since we simply apply a Fréchet inequality. Note that the other190
results in the paper, after this section, do not make use of the conversion used in this section, in191
order to avoid the potential information loss.192
For systems containing components in series or parallel, when the component failures are known193
to be independent, the fragility can be calculated by using Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4), respectively.194
Alternatively, if the failure dependence is unknown we can use the relevant Fréchet inequality,195
Eqns. (2) and (3), to yield the fragility. Alternatively, in the case of unknown failure dependence,196
the rare event approximation (described in Section 2) can be used to justify the application of197
Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4) which will be accurate in the tails of the distributions (i.e. for rare events).198
Therefore, using the natural interval extension of Eqn. (2) with Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (7) it can be199
shown that, for components in series, the probability of failure at a particular ground motion, a,200
with certainty falls in the interval given by201
f (s |a) ∈
[
max
i
[
f (ci |a)
]
,min (1,
n∑
i=1
[
f (ci |a)
]
)
]
, (8)202
i.e.
f (s |a) ∈

max
i

φ
©­­­­­­«
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log ( aβi
)
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log ( aβi
)
2σi
ª®®®®®®¬

,
min
©­­­­­­«
1,
n∑
i=1

φ
©­­­­­­«
log
(
a
βi
)
−
log
(
a
βi
)
2σi
+
log
(
a
βi
)
+
log
(
a
βi
)
2σi
ª®®®®®®¬

ª®®®®®®¬

. (9)
Product of log-normally distributed random variables203
Often the fragility curve for a component must be established by considering the product of a204
number of random variables with lognormal distributions. If this is the case then the probability205
bounds analysis approach can be extended to allow us to find the relevant fragility curve. To206
demonstrate, consider a general random variable d which is given by the product of other random207
variables, i.e.208
d = q
arbs
ct
, (10)209
where a, b and c are lognormal random variables and q, r , s and t are constants. It is clear that210
d will be lognormally distributed with median βd = q
βraβ
s
b
βtc
, and logarithmic standard deviation211
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c (Kennedy et al. 1980).212
In the case of interval imprecision in the distribution parameters of a, b and c we can obtain213
βd = q ·
βra · βsb
βt
c
, (11)214
and215
βd = q ·
βra · βsb
βtc
, (12)216
by using the endpoint formulae for interval multiplication (Moore et al. 2009) with knowledge of217
the support of the distribution parameters. The logarithmic standard deviation can be obtained218
from219
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c , (13)220
and221
σ2d = r
2σ2a + s
2σ2b + t
2σ2c , (14)222
by taking the interval extension of the expression stated above for the case of no interval imprecision.223
This is principally of use when computing the response factor, F, which can be expressed as the224
product of a number of response factors applying to different pieces of equipment and processes (for225
example damping effects or modelling effects), i.e. F =
∏
i Fi. The Fi are modelled as lognormal226
random variables and may have interval imprecision in the median (Sundararajan 2012).227
Failure Probability228
Consider a systemwhich fails when the load exceeds the strength. For a general load distribution229
the failure probability is given by230
P f = −
∫ ∞
0
dH(a)
da
f (s |a)da, (15)231
where H(a) is the seismic hazard curve (i.e. the probability that the ‘load’ exceeds a certain value in232
a particular unit of time, which usually takes the form of the complement of a CDF since it must be233
monotonically decreasing, and the probability cannot exceed 1) (American Society of Civil Engi-234
neers 2005). When H(a) and f (s |a) are both log normally distributed, it is simple to solve Eqn. (15)235
by transforming the integral (Kapur and Lamberson 1977). However, in general this integral is not236
solvable analytically and it cannot be solved analytically when the fragility curve is replaced with237
the distribution free probability boxes derived in the previous section.238
Therefore to derive bounds on the failure probability of systems subject to distributional proba-239
bility box loads and fragilities we will apply Fréchet bounds and interval arithmetic to well known240
results obtained by solving Eqn. (15) for common probability distributions.241
For example consider the case where the probability distribution function of the load, dH(a)da ,242
is log-normally distributed with parameters βl and σl and the fragility, f (s |a), is lognormally243
distributed with parameters βi and σi. In this case, the failure probability can be evaluated as244
P f = φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
ª®®¬ . (16)245
A plot of distributions used in Eqn. (16) with example parameters is shown in Figure 3.246
To calculate an upper bound on the failure probability for a series system we evaluate the247
maximum and minimum of Eqn. (16) with βl ∈ [βl, β¯l], σl ∈ [σl, σ¯l], βi ∈ [βi, β¯i], σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i] and248
Eqn. (2). Analogously, for components in parallel a similar result can be obtained from Eqn. (3).249
For simple systems these bounds provide useful analytic quantification of the reliability of the250
system under epistemic uncertainty. However, for more complex systems the bounds are usually251
not analytically calculable and hence numerical integration may be necessary (e.g. (Samaniego252
2007), (Patelli et al. 2017b), (Feng et al. 2016)).253
It is likely that there is uncertainty in βl and σl . If this is the case then the analysis can be made254
robust using an uncertainty quantification approach for the load distribution which is analogous to255
the approach used for the fragility.256
In some works, such as ASCE 43-05 (Braverman et al. 2007), the hazard curve has been257
modelled as a power law, since this is a good approximation to the Cauchy-Pareto complementary258
cumulative distribution function (Kennedy 2011). Such an equation takes the form of259
H(a) = k1a−KH, (17)260
where k1 and KH are positive fitted constants. KH represents the slope of the mean seismic hazard261
curve when plotted on log-log scale. With a log-normal fragility in the parametrisation used in this262
paper, the failure probability for a single component is given by263
P f = H(βi) exp (KHσi)
2
2
. (18)264
A plot of distributions used in Eqn. (18) with example parameters is shown in Figure 4.265
When there is interval imprecision in KH , k1, βi and σi we can obtain bounds on the failure266
probability, and this result can be generalised trivially to the case of a parallel or series system267
using the formulae given in Section 2.268
Summary of Failure Probability expressions269
In order to facilitate the efficient use of this paper, this section provides a list of results which270
can be derived from the previous section. Derivations for these results are provided in Appendix I.271
• Parallel System with unknown dependence; Lognormal load and Strength:272
P f =
∑
ci⊂S
min
φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬
 − (n − 1) (19a)
and
P f = min
ci⊂S
max
φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σ2i + σ
2
l
ª®®¬

 (19b)
273
• Series system with unknown dependence; Lognormal load and Strength:
P f =
∑
ci⊂S
max
φ
©­­«−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log βi − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ
2
l
ª®®¬
 (20a)
and
P f = max
ci⊂S
min
φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
ª®®¬

 (20b)
274
• Series system with independent components (upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Log-normal load and strength:
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 −max
φ
©­­«−
log βi − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log βi − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ
2
l
ª®®¬

 (21a)
and
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
1 −min
φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
ª®®¬

 (21b)
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• Parallel system (independent components - upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Log-normal load and strength
P f =
∏
ci⊂S
min
φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log β¯l√
σ¯2i + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log β¯i − log β¯l√
σi2 + σ¯
2
l
ª®®¬
 (22a)
and
P¯ f =
∏
ci⊂S
max
φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σ¯2i + σ
2
l
ª®®¬ , φ
©­­«−
log βi − log βl√
σi2 + σ
2
l
ª®®¬
 (22b)
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• Single Component; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Lognormal,
with median β ∈ [β, β¯] and logarithmic standard deviation σ ∈ [σ, σ¯]:
P¯ f = k¯1 max
[
β−K¯H exp
(K¯Hσ¯)2
2
, β−KH exp
(KHσ¯)2
2
]
(23a)
and conservative lower bound
P f = k1 β¯
−K¯H exp
(KHσ)2
2
(23b)
If KH > log β¯σ2 or K¯H <
log β
σ¯2
a tighter lower bound is obtained from:
P f = k1 min
[
β¯−KH exp
(
KHσ
)2
2
, β¯−K¯H exp
(
K¯Hσ
)2
2
]
(23c)
277
• Parallel system with unknown dependence; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and
KH ∈ [KH, K¯H] Lognormal, with median βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation
σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f = k¯1 min
ci⊂S
[
max
[
β−K¯H
i
exp
(K¯Hσ¯i)2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KHσ¯i)2
2
] ]
(24a)
and
P f = k1
∑
ci⊂S
[
β¯i
−K¯H exp
(KHσi)2
2
]
− (n − 1) (24b)
• Series system with unknown dependence; Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈
[KH, K¯H] Log-normal, with median βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈
[σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f = k¯1
∑
ci⊂S
max
[
β−K¯H
i
exp
(K¯Hσ¯i)2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KHσ¯i)2
2
]
(25a)
and
P f = k1 maxci⊂S
[
β¯i
−K¯H exp
(KHσi)2
2
]
(25b)
• Parallel system with independent components ( upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Log-normal, with median
βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i]:
P¯ f =
∏
ci⊂S
k1 max
[
β−K¯H
i
exp
(K¯Hσ¯i)2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KHσ¯i)2
2
]
(26a)
and
P f =
∏
ci⊂S
k¯1 β¯i
−K¯H exp
(KHσi)2
2
(26b)
• Series system with independent components (upper bound also valid for dependant rare
events); Power Law Load, with k1 ∈ [k1, k¯1] and KH ∈ [KH, K¯H]; Log-normal, with median
βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] and logarithmic standard deviation σi ∈ [σi, σ¯i] :
P¯ f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
[
1 − k¯1 max
[
β−K¯H
i
exp
(K¯Hσ¯i)2
2
, β
−KH
i exp
(KHσ¯i)2
2
] ]
(27a)
and
P f = 1 −
∏
ci⊂S
[
1 − k1 β¯i−K¯H exp
(KHσi)2
2
]
(27b)
Imprecise FORM278
The failure probability of a structural system calculated by Eqn. (15) can be approximated by279
P f = φ(−β), using the well known FORM approximation, where β is the reliability index. The280
reliability index can be obtained from281
β =
µS − µL
σ2L + σ
2
S
, (28)282
where µS and µL are the mean values of the strength and load and σL and σS are the standard283
deviations of the strength and load. Note that the FORM approximation holds exactly for linear284
limit state functions with normally distributed strength and load, but is only an approximation when285
the mean and standard deviations of other distributions are used.286
In (Qiu et al. 2008) this is extended to the case of probability box random variables, so that287
P¯ f = φ(−β) and P f = φ(−β¯) where288
β¯ =
µ¯S − µL
σL2 + σS2
, (29)289
and290
β =
µ
S
− µ¯L
σ¯2L + σ¯
2
S
. (30)291
In more complex cases one may need to use optimisation to find the reliability index using292
methods derived from the Hasofer-Lind method (Jiang et al. 2017). For example, one could293
imagine a system which fails if the sum of many different products of probability box distributed294
variables falls below a threshold. However, even in these cases, we can attempt to analyse in which295
conditions the system is likely to fail using a simple analytical method.296
Consider a load term which is the product of a constant and a random variable, i.e. L = CLd ,297
where C is a constant and Ld is a random variable representing the design load. The system will298
have a P f = 0.5 when β = 0, which implies the strength to load ratio, γ = µSµL , will be equal to 1.299
Clearly, this is only the case when C = γd = µSµLd , i.e. the applied load is scaled by the strength to300
design load ratio (Prinja et al. 2017).301
This can be trivially extended in the case of probability box variables to find an interval load302
for which P f = 0.5, i.e. L0.5 ∈ [L0.5, L¯0.5] = [γdLd, γ¯dLd, ] where303
γ¯d =
µ¯S
µ
Ld
, (31)304
and305
γ
d
=
µ
S
µ¯Ld
. (32)306
Note that the standard deviation of the random variables is not involved in the calculation of307
this load.308
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES309
Reliability analysis of a simple concrete containment310
To demonstrate the results described in the previous sections wewill consider amodified version311
of an example given in (Modarres et al. 2016) with interval imprecision in the coefficient of variation312
of the random variables. The random variables will be modelled with lognormal distributions since313
lognormal distributions are commonly used to model physical quantities which must always be314
positive in the probabilistic safety analysis literature (Sundararajan 2012), (Kennedy et al. 1980).315
However note our approach could be applied to similar problems with different distribution types,316
andmany other distributions exist to ensure positivity of randomvariables. The problem description317
will be briefly replicated in this section for clarity.318
A concrete containment is a structure designed to prevent radioactive release from nuclear319
power plants to the environment. It is therefore important that the reliability of this structure can320
be determined accurately, as failing to do so could have severe consequences for the environment321
and the general public. During the process of determining the reliability of a containment, engi-322
neers wish to determine the relationship between applied pressure and failure probability of the323
containment. A simplified performance function is used to perform reliability analysis without324
having to run simulations on a complex finite element model. This approach is advantageous as the325
computational time required is significantly reduced. The approach assumes that the system will326
fail if the load is larger than the strength.327
The containment’s strength is considered to be divided between 7 failure mode contributors, all328
of which may cause system failure. Therefore, this example can be treated as a system composed329
of 7 components (which are modelled as random variables), connected in series.330
The probability of failure for the containment is given by331
P f =
∫
St<Lt
f (x)dx, (33)332
where f (x) is the joint probability distribution function of the random variables, x = (x1, x2...) and333
St and Lt represent the strength and load terms respectively. The input parameter values assumed334
in this analysis were taken approximately from the original example (Modarres et al. 2016), but335
modified to fit lognormal variables and include some imprecision as shown in Table 1. The pressure336
load inside the containment, for the specific accident being considered, was taken to be lognormally337
distributed with mean 0.575 MPa and standard deviation of 0.117 MPa (such that the parameters338
for the fitted lognormal distribution were log β = −0.5737 MPa and σ = 0.2014 MPa).339
The fragility of the series system was bounded using Eqn. (9) and compared to the empirical340
CDFs obtained by randomly sampling the epistemic uncertainty. The results are shown in Figure 5.341
The failure probability was calculated using Eqn. (20), since the dependence between failure342
modes was unknown. This resulted in a failure probability between 0.0086 and 0.0123, which343
contains the precise probability of failure (P f = 0.0122) given in (Modarres et al. 2016). This344
result was verified by use of double loop Monte Carlo simulation, which was performed using the345
same samples used to generate Figure 5 (100 epistemic samples and 1000 aleatory samples). The346
analytic code took 0.027 seconds to run, whilst the double loop Monte Carlo simulation took 0.16347
seconds to run on an 2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 processor inMatlab. In addition the result from double348
loop Monte Carlo simulation would require more samples, and hence even greater time, to increase349
accuracy in the tails of the p-box to an arbitrary amount already achieved by the analytic approach.350
These results reveal a good agreement with the expensive simulation procedures in a fraction351
(one fifth) of the time. Note that although in this case the double loop Monte Carlo was quick to352
run, this may not be true in general (such as in high dimensional cases). In addition, the Monte353
Carlo simulation could be one nested component in a much larger computation. Even when this354
is not the case, it is unrealistic to expect practising engineers to resort to double loop Monte Carlo355
simulation for what should be a simple design calculation, even with the inclusion of epistemic356
uncertainty. In practical cases it would also be necessary to consider uncertainty in the Logarithmic357
Mean of the random variables which can be easily accounted for given the developments in Section358
3.359
Containment with Additive Component Strengths360
In many real systems the components’ strengths may be added together, rather than combined361
in parallel or series. Such an example is given in (Prinja et al. 2017). This poses a challenge362
for analytical methods, as in general normal distributions and log normal distributions cannot be363
summed easily (except in limited cases such as independently distributed normal random variables).364
Therefore, in order to consider such systems in the imprecise PSA framework, we resort to using365
the imprecise FORM approximations given in (Qiu et al. 2008).366
A pre-stressed concrete containment is a concrete structure designed to prevent the release of367
radiation from the core of a nuclear reactor to the environment. The structural reliability analysis368
of pre-stressed concrete containments is a key component of level 2 PSA.369
In (Prinja et al. 2017) probabilistic safety analysis of a concrete containment was presented370
as part of a round robin international test exercise. Two experimental test cases (Sandia National371
Laboratories and Bhabha Atomic Research Centre) are described and the probability of failure for372
each containment is calculated. The experiments are compared to a cylindrical concrete containment373
model, where the area and strength of the concrete, rebar, tendons and liner aremodelled as normally374
distributed random variables. In this study, we will focus on the SNL containment, but add some375
epistemic uncertainty to the random variables. This epistemic uncertainty could represent lack of376
knowledge about the materials used for yield values, or lack of knowledge about the design being377
considered for geometric properties. The modified properties of the Sandia National Laboratories378
containment are summarised in Table 2.379
The performance function of the containment is obtained as a load-strength relationship, i.e.380
g = (AsFs + AtFt + AlFl + AcFc) − PR. (34)381
We set the applied pressure to be equal to the design pressure, scaled by a constant.382
Using the strength to design load ratio method from Eqn. (31) and Eqn. (32) with383
µ¯S
µ
L
=
µ¯As µ¯Fs + µ¯At µ¯Ft + µ¯Ac µ¯Fc + µ¯Al µ¯Fl
µ
Pd
µR
(35)384
and385
µ
S
µ¯L
=
µ
As
µ
Fs
+ µ
At
µ
Ft
+ µ
Ac
µ
Fc
+ µ
Al
µ
Fl
µ¯Pd µ¯R
(36)386
we find that P f = 0.5 when P ∈ [5.2Pd, 5.24Pd]. In order words, because of our epistemic387
uncertainty in the structural properties of the system we are unsure which pressure causes P f = 0.5.388
Clearly the epistemic uncertainty we have considered does not significantly change the pressure at389
which P f = 0.5.390
For a more complete understanding of the system (i.e. understanding which pressures cause391
large and small failure probabilities) advanced simulation methods would be necessary. This is392
because the strength to design-load ratio method only considers the mean values of the random393
variable in order to find the pressure at which the structure has P f = 0.5, and does not consider394
the variability of the structural components. For example, one could resort to the method proposed395
in Ref. (de Angelis et al. 2015), where line sampling is applied to structures with epistemic396
uncertainties.397
CONCLUSIONS398
In this paper, we have demonstrated methods to analytically propagate probability boxes in399
commonly used probabilistic safety analysis equations. These equations include series and par-400
allel systems with unknown dependencies, lognormal fragility distributions and equations where401
lognormally distributed factors are multiplied. In addition, Power Law Load load distributions are402
considered. Crucially, we use intervals to model epistemic uncertainty in the parameters of these403
distributions. This enables the robust quantification of epistemic uncertainty when performing404
probabilistic safety analysis, particularly in an industrial context. These distributions are sufficient405
for the analysis of many industrial problems, but in general the imprecise probability methods406
proposed could be generalised to other distributions as well.407
These expressions are imprecise probabilistic analogues to many of the probabilistic formulae408
proposed in Kennedy’s paper (Kennedy et al. 1980), which have become standard expressions used409
in probabilistic safety analysis. We also demonstrate how similar techniques can be applied to410
simplified calculations involving more complex models.411
Our proposed expressions enable engineers to complete essential design calculations whilst412
considering epistemic uncertainty, and avoid the impracticalities of double loop Monte Carlo413
simulation which we believe is a significant barrier to the modelling of epistemic uncertainty in414
many industrial probabilistic safety assessment workflows.415
APPENDIX I. PROOFS416
Proof of Eqns. (6) and (7)417
Firstly, note that φ is a monotonic function of its arguments, so finding the maxima and minima418
of Eqn. (5) is reduced to finding themaxima andminima of
log aβi
σi
when βi ∈ [βi, β¯i] andσi ∈ [σi, σ¯i].419
Then note that log a
β¯i
< log aβ i < log
a
βi
. The upper bound is found by noting that if 0 < log aβi then420
log aβ i
σi
<
log aβi
σi
and if 0 > log aβi then
log aβ i
σi
<
log aβi
σ¯i
. The lower bound is found by noting that if421
0 < log a
β¯i
then
log aβ i
σi
>
log a
β¯i
σ¯i
and if 0 > log a
β¯i
then
log aβ i
σi
>
log a
β¯i
σi
.422
Finally, note that it is trivial to construct a function which takes a different value above and423
below zero, e.g. f1(x)−| f1(x)|c1 +
f1(x)+| f1(x)|
c2
is equal to 2 f1(x)c2 above zero and
2 f1(x)
c1
below zero. This424
concludes the proof.425
Proof of Equations in Section 3426
The failure probability bounds for a parallel system with unknown dependencies and lognor-427
mally distributed load and strength, Eqn. (19), can be derived by applying the natural interval428
extension of the Fréchet inequality for the intersection, Eqn. (3), to the natural interval extension429
of the failure probability for a lognormal component, Eqn. (16).430
Eqn. (20), the series system with unknown dependencies and lognormally distributed load and431
strength is derived in the same way, except this time the union Fréchet inequality (Eqn. (2)) is432
applied.433
Eqn. (21) and Eqn. (22) can be derived in the same way by applying Eqn. (1) and Eqn. (4),434
respectively.435
The derivation of Eqn. (23) (single component with power law load and log normal fragility)436
is more complex, due to repeated variables (KH) (Moore et al. 2009). Firstly, note that P f =437
H(βi) exp (KHσi)
2
2 = k1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ2i ). Recall that k1 > 0, KH > 0, β > 0 and σ > 0.438
Note thatP f ismonotonic in k1,σi and βi, so our task is simply to findmaxKH k¯1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ¯2i )439
and minKH kl exp (−KH log β¯i + 12K2Hσ2i ).440
The function k1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ2i ) is quadratic in KH and has a global minima in KH at441
KH =
log β
σ2
. ClearlymaxKH k¯1 exp (−KH log βi + 12K2Hσ¯2i ) takes itsmaximumvalue at K¯H orKH . El-442
ementary interval analysis reveals that kl exp (−KH log β¯i + 12K2Hσ2i ) > kl exp (−K¯H log β¯i + 12KH2σ2i ).443
However in reality KH and KH cannot appear in the same expression, as they represent specific444
values of the same quantity. A tighter bound is obtained by checking if KH < log β¯iσi2 < K¯H . If this445
inequality holds then the minimum occurs at KH = log β¯iσi2 . Otherwise we must check which of K¯H446
and KH minimises the failure probability. Then the remaining results can be obtained by applying447
the union or intersection Fréchet inequalities, or rare event approximation as appropriate.448
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density functions for the stress and strength are shown. The shaded area represents the integrand
in Eqn. (15), which yields the failure probability P f = 0.14. The example parameter values for the
plotted distributions were βl = 1ms−2, σl = 1, βi = 3ms−2 and σi = 0.2.
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Fig. 4. Demonstration of failure probability calculation with Eqn. (18). The lognormal probability
density functions for the stress and strength are shown. The shaded area represents the integrand
in Eqn. (15), which yields the failure probability P f = 0.12. The example parameter values for the
plotted distributions were KH = 2, k1 = 1(ms−2)KH , βi = 3ms−2 and σi = 0.2.
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Fig. 5. Probability box representing the fragility curve of the series system, computed analytically.
For comparison, the results of a double loop Monte Carlo simulation are shown, which was
computed by making 100 epistemic samples and 1000 aleatory samples.
